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In The 
SUPREME COURT 
Of The 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------------
CRAIG A. BLAMIRES, 
* 
Plaintiff-Appellant, * 
vs. 
* 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE * 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL * 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent.* 
Case No. 
15676 
--------------------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Original proceeding to review a decision of the 
Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security 
of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an original proceeding to review a decision 
of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah which Board affirmed a decision of the Appeals 
Referee of the Commission that plaintiff-appellant, 
Craig Blarnires, was not eligible for unemployment corn-
pensation under the Utah Employment Security Act. 
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The question posed for determination is whether or 
not appellant was in "employment" in his relationship 
with Medexarn of Utah as defined by the Utah Employment 
Security Act, Section 35-4-22 (j) (1) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and whether or not such services are excluded 
under the provisions of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On October 3, 1977, appellant, Craig Blarnires, 
appealed to the Appeals Referee of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Department of Employment Security from a decision 
of a department representative dated September 22, 
1977, wherein it was held that appellant was not "in 
employment" within the meaning of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. The Appeals Referee on December 8, 1977, 
issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decision affirming the decision of the department represent-
ative declaring ·that appellant was not entitled to 
unemployment compensation. Appellant subsequently 
appealed to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. After reviewing the record, the Board of 
Review without making findings of fact or conclusions 
of law of its own, affirmed the decision of the Appeals 
Referee. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The decision of the representative of the Utah 
Department of Employment Security upheld by the Appeals 
Referee and the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah is contrary to the law as supported by the 
facts and should be reversed thereby allowing appellant, 
Craig Blamires, unemployment compensation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant began working for Medexam of Utah sometime 
during the month of September 1976. (R.0036) Appellant 
had been doing the same kind of work for a company 
named Body Metrics before beginning his employment 
with Medexam and had been trained by Body Metrics. 
(R.0036) Consequently Medexam was pleased to have 
appellant work for them because of his prior experience. 
Appellant began his employment with Medexam as the 
regional manager. (R.0036) 
Medexam is a corporation that performs physical 
examinations or premedical examinations as required 
by various life insurance companies for the purpose 
of underwriting risks. (R.0036) Medexam would contact 
and negotiate with various insurance companies agreeing 
to do physical examinations on those persons who may 
be applying for insurance from that particular company. 
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Medexam, not appellant, would set the price that appellant 
would charge for each of the examinations completed. 
(R.0038) Appellant was required to follow the prices 
established by Medexam. (R.0039) As regional manager 
appellant was to supervise the northern Utah and southern 
Idaho areas and was to perform physical examinations 
as well. The central office of Medexam likewise performed 
physical examinations at its office located in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (R. 0037) 
At the time appellant began his employment with 
Medexam, he did not enter into a written agreement 
with Medexam. (R. 0037) At the time he began his employment 
1 with Medexam, appellant was directed by the president 
of Medexam to work out of his home. (R. 0037) Later 
he rented space in Ogden, Utah and signed the lease 
in the name of Medexam. (R.0044) In addition, appellant 
obtained a telephone listing in the name of Medexam and 
the obligation for the telephone was guaranteed by 
the president of Medexam. (R.0044) 
The various insurance companies would direct their 
applicants for insurance to contact one of the Medexam 
offices. The Medexam office for the Ogden, Utah area 
was operated by appellant. Appellant would submit 
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to the central office of Medexam the names· of those 
persons who had been examined by him together with 
the name of the insurance company. The insurance company 
would be billed by the central office of Medexam and would 
pay Medexam directly. Medexam would then pay to appellant 
10 percent of the fees collected while retaining 30 
percent for itself. (R.0041) In approximately January 
1977, the fee arrangement was changed so that appellant 
received 90 percent of the fees generated while Medexam 
retained 10 percent. (R.0041) 
Appellant established under the direction of Medexam 
other branch offices in northern Utah and southern 
Idaho. Each branch office was operated by one person 
generally out of that person's home. The operator 
would perform physical examinations but the fee to 
be charged for such was controlled by the central office 
of Medexam. (R.0040-0042) Appellant paid the operators 
of the branches from funds he received from Medexam. 
(R.0041) The amounts paid by appellant to the branch 
operators were the amounts suggested by Mr. Smith, president 
of Medexam. (R.0042) Appellant was required by Medexam 
to prepare a written list of goals and management objectives 
and was to submit them to Medexam. (R.0026) 
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Appellant did not enter into any written agreement 
with Medexam. Medexam demanded that appellant sign 
a document called a partnership agreement dated May 10, 
1977. (R.0027) Medexam terminated appellant sometime 
in May, 1977, and rehired him three days later. (R.0047) 
A dispute arose between appellant and Medexam as to 
the payment of wages and appellant submitted his letter 
of resignation on July 23, 1977. (R. 0048) Upon the 
resignation of Mr. Blamires, Medexam took control of 
the telephone number and place of business and began 
immediately to continue the Medexarn operation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED IN RULING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT WITHIN "EMPLOYMENT" AS CONTEM-
PLATED BY THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
It is clear from the decision of the Appeals Referee 
(R.0022-0024) that his decision was based on the fact 
that Medexam maintained insufficient control over appellant 
to bring the relationship between appellant and Medexarn 
within the common-law definition of master-servant. 
The Court's attention is invited to page 0024 of the Record. 
There the Appeals Referee cited an American Jurisprudence 
quotation relating to common-law definitions of what 
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constitutes a master-servant relationship. The Appeals 
Referee then said, 
"In the instant case there is no evidence that 
Medexam exercised control as to the means and 
manner of accomplishment. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
The Appeals Referee therefore finds: 
"During the base period July l, 1976, through 
June 30, 1977, the claimant was not an employee 
of Medexam but was self-employed, and during 
the base period the claimant had insufficient 
weeks of employment for eligibility." (R.0024) 
The Appeals Referee erred in applying common-law 
definitions of a master-servant relationship to the 
present case before the Court. In one of the leading 
cases interpreting the Utah Employment Security Act, 
the Court said in Creameries of America v. Industrial 
Commission, 98 Utah 571, 102 P. 2d 300 (1940), 
"We adhere to our previous decision to the effect 
that whether applicant Foss-is entitled to 
unemployment benefits must be determined from 
the tests laid down in the Unemployment Compensation 
Act, rather than from any common-law concepts 
of master and servant." Id. at 303. 
Of similar importance is Salt Lake Transportation 
v. Board of Review, 5 Ut. 2d 87, 296 P. 2d 983 (1956). 
There it was necessary for the Court to determine whether 
taxi cab drivers were lessees or employees of plaintiff. 
The Court in noting with approval the concession of 
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the plaintiff said, 
"Plaintiff concedes that it is well settled in 
this jurisdiction that the meaning of terms 
'employer' and 'employee' are determined by the 
Act and are not confined to the common-law 
concepts of their meaning. The Employment 
Security Act having been enacted under the 
police powers for the benefit of the general 
public welfare its provisions are to be liberally 
construed to effectuate that purpose. Therefore 
this Court has held that the terms 'employment,' 
'services' and 'wages' include many persons and 
relationships and means of compensation not 
contemplated by those terms under the common-law." 
Id. at 984. 
Rather than the common-law definitions, the appropriate 
tests which the Court referred to in Creameries of America, 
supra, are found in Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, wherein it states, 
"Services performed by an individual for wages or 
under any contract of hire, written or oral, express 
or implied, shall be deemed to be employment 
subject to this act unless and until it is 
shown to the satisfaction of the commission that: 
(A) Such individual has been and will continue 
to be free from control or direction over 
the performance of such services, both under 
his contract of hire and in fact; 
(B) 
(C) 
Such service is either outside the usual 
course of the business for which such service 
is performed or that such service is pe~­
formed outside of all the places of bus~ness 
of the enterprise for which such service is 
performed; and 
Such individual is customarily engaged i~ an 
independently established trade, occupat~on, 
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profession, or business of the same nature 
as that involved in the contract of service." 
The Court, however, noted in Creameries of America, 
supra, that the terms "seryices" and "personal services" 
are not specifically defined by the Act, and then instructed, 
"In ordinary usage the term "services has a rather 
broad and general meaning. It includes generally 
any act performed for the benefit of another under 
some arrangement or agreement whereby such act was 
to have been performed. The general definition of 
"service" as given in Webster's New International 
Dictionary is "performance of labor for the benefit 
of another"; "Act or instance of helping, or benefit-
ing". The term "personal service" indicates that 
the "act" done for the benefit of another is done 
personally by a particular individual." Id. at 304. 
After discussing the definition other jurisdictions 
have placed on "services", the Court in Creameries of 
America, supra, ruled the broader meaning referred to in the 
quote above is applicable. The Court said, 
"No indication is given in the Act that the 
legislature intended to give a restricted mean-
ing to such term. On the contrary the way in 
which 'services' or 'personal services' appears 
in our Unemployment Compensation Act indicates 
an intention on the part of the legislature to 
use the term in its broad general sense." Id. at 305. 
The Court also ruled that "wages" under the act consist of 
any remuneration paid by the employer for "services" or 
"personal services" rendered. 
Applying the principles set forth in the case, the 
Court in Creameries of America, supra, held that the indivi-
dual who had entered into a contract called a "Franchise 
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Agreement" denominating him as ~ dealer and granting him 
the exclusive right to sell products of plaintiff was in 
employment within the meaning of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. Creameries of America was later followed 
in Leach v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 123 
Utah 423, 260 P. 2d 744 (1953). There the Court determined 
that certain franchise dealers and contract installers 
were in the employment of plaintiff within the meaning of 
the Employment Security Act of Utah. The Court reasoned, 
"If the dealers and the installers rendered 
services for the plaintiffs for wages or under 
a contract of hire, then the plaintiffs had 
persons in their employment and are liable 
for contributions on their wages unless those 
persons are excluded from the Act by the 
exclusion test contained in Section 35-4-22 
(j) (5) (A), (B), and (C), which test we will conside; 
later in this opinion." Id. at 746. 
Applying the broad definition in accordance with the 
Court decisions referred to above, it is clear that 
appellant performed services for his employer, Medexarn, 
for which he received wages. It is clear from the Record 
that appellant was hired by Medexam to act as regional 
manager and to conduct physical examinations. Medexarn 
received as much as 30 percent of the proceeds from medical 
examinations performed by appellant which amount was later ' 
reduced to 10 percent. In addition, Medexam was greatly 
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benefited by appellants expanding the operations of 
Medexam in northern Utah and southern Idaho. As the operation 
became larger, more revenue was generated for Medexam, and 
the name "Medexam" became known over a larger area. Clearly 
the activities of appellant constituted acts performed for 
the benefit of another under some arrangement or agreement 
whereby the act was to have been performed. 
There can be no doubt that the income received by appellant 
from Medexam comes within the broad definition of "wages". 
In Creameries of America, supra, the Court said, 
"That the income received by Foss from the distribution 
of products for plaintiff comes within the definition 
of 'wages' is also evident. All remuneration 
payable for personal services is 'wages'." Id. at 305. 
There can be no question that appellant was in the 
employment of Medexam for purposes of the Utah Employment 
Security Act, and unless appellant is excluded from the 
Act by the exclusionary tests contained in Section 35-4-22 
(j) (5) (A), (B), and (C), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, he 
must be allowed benefits under the Utah Employment Security 
Act. 
POINT II 
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED IN NOT APPLYING 
EACH OF THE EXCLUSIONARY TESTS SET FORTH IN 
SUBSECTIONS (A) , (B) , AND (C) OF SECTION 35-4-22 
(j) (5) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, BECAUSE (A)' 
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(B) , AND (C) ARE FRAMED IN THE CONJUNCTIVE SO 
THAT ALL THREE TESTS MUST BE MET BEFORE AN EMPLOYEE 
CAN BE EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE UTAH 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
There can be no doubt that subsections (A) , (B), and IC 
of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) are framed in the conjunctive 
so that all three tests must be met in order to exclude 
appellant from unemployment compensation. In Johanson 
Brothers Builders v. Board of Review of Industrial Conunissio:' 
118 Utah 384, 222 P. 2d 563 (1950) the Court found that ceru 
persons were employees of plaintiff rather than partners 
with plaintiff. The Court ruled that such persons came 
within the Employment Security Act because the work they 
performed constituted services for plaintiff. With regard 
to the exclusionary tests, the Court instructed as follows, 
"Furthermore, if we test the relationship by the 
exclusions set forth in the quoted paragraph, we 
find that the services performed by the workers 
cannot be excluded. The subsections are conjunctive 
and the wording requires that tests prescribed 
by all three must be met before the relationship 
can be excluded." Id. at 568. 
The paragraphs referred to are the same as subsections 
(A), (B), and (C) of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
In addition, in Leach v. Board of Review of Indust~ 
Commission, 123 Utah 423, 260 P. 2d 744 (1953), the court 
after quoting the subsections (A), (B), and (C) said, 
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"It will be noted that the three requirements of 
the test are stated conjunctively and hence all 
three requirements must be met if the services 
rendered for the plaintiffs are to be excluded 
from the act." Id. at 748. 
There can be no question that the Appeals Referee 
failed to apply the definitions contained in the Utah 
Employment Security Act to determine whether appellant 
was in fact in employment within the Act. The Appeals 
Referee based his decision on the fact that Medexam, 
in the opinion of the Appeals Referee, did not have 
sufficient control over appellant, and therefore, appellant 
was self-employed so that he could not qualify as a 
person who was unemployed as that term is defined in 
Section 35-4-22 (m) (l), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Looking at the decision of the Appeals Referee in the 
best possible light, it is apparent that the Appeals 
Referee used only the exclusionary test contained in 
subsection (A) of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, in denying appellant unemployment compensation. 
Excluding appellant from unemployment benefits, because 
he came within only one of the exclusionary test was error. 
The tests are framed in the conjunctive and the Appeals 
Referee would have to have found appellant was excluded by 
each of the tests in order to be excluded from being in 
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employment under the Utah Employment Security Act. 
POINT III 
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
APPELLANT WAS FREE FROM THE CONTROL OR THE 
DIRECTION OF MEDEXAM. 
The Appeals Referee seemed to ground his decision 
upon a finding that "there is no evidence that Medexarn 
exercised control as to the means and manner of accomplish· 
ment." (R.0024) There can be no doubt that the observation 
of the Appeals Referee is in error when one reviews the 
Reporter's transcript contained in the Record. The Court's 
attention is respectfully invited to page two of the 
Reporter's transcript (R.0037) where the Referee asks, 
"Q. Now, did you have to select your own place 
of business there or where did you work from? 
A. When I started out, I started at my home. I 
worked out of my home. He had me working out 
of my home. (Emphasis added)" 
Not only did Medexam direct appellant as to where he 
should commence working, but it held absolute control 
over the price he was to charge the insurance companies. 
"Q. Now, who sets the price for the exam? 
A. Medexam does. Mr. Smith. 
Q. Mr. Smith. They set the price that you would 
charge the defendant on the type of examination? 
A. Yes. Some may require for instance, an EKG 
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and then an additional charge would be made for that. 
Q. And they tell you what you can charge? 
A. Yes. They give me the information as to 
what you can charge. 
Q. In other words, the company sets the price. 
Now are you able to change that price? Are 
you at liberty to change that price -increase 
it? 
A. No at one time I was charging as was instructed 
so much for each item, and he instructed me, 
'No, that is not right. We only charge this 
set fee for the whole thing.'" (Page three 
of the Reporter's transcript, R.0038) 
Even in the situation where appellant might have 
contacted the insurance agents who had not been previously 
contacted by the horne office of Medexarn in Salt Lake City, 
appellant was not at liberty to negotiate a price with them 
but rather was controlled by the pricing schedule set by 
Medexarn. Additionally, even when appellant sought to 
increase the wage he could earn by establishing branch 
offices, the branch offices could only charge the fee that 
Medexarn dictated to him. 
It is also significant that the insurance companies 
did not pay appellant directly, but rather all checks were 
made payable to Medexarn as shown on page six of the 
Reporter's transcript (R.0041) wherein it states, 
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"Referee: Now, then - those monies were not 
actually received by you, is that 
correct? They were paid by the 
insurance companies to Medexam? 
Blarnires: To Medexarn. That is correct." 
It should also be pointed out that Medexam controlled 
all of the billing to the insurance companies as well. 
As further evidence of control over appellant, Medexam 
provided at no cost to appellant various supplies and 
forms which appellant was directed to use in his work. 
Also important is the control over the telephone listing. 
As noted at page nine of the Reporter's transcript, (R.00441 
the telephone number was listed under the name of Medexam, 
and payment of the telephone bill was guaranteed by the 
president of Medexam. 
When Medexam terminated appellant, it retained the 
telephone listing as "Medexam" and kept the same telephone 
number. Had appellant been an independent contractor, he 
would have had the right to the telephone number under his 
own name at the end of the contract with Medexarn. 
When appellant finally found an office location 
outside of his home, he signed the lease agreement "Craig 
Blarnires, Medexam". Each time appellant was terminated 
• I 
ld · d t · e the bus1ness' by Medexam, Medexam wou step ~n an con ~nu 
d e busines: using the same name, same telephone number an sam 
I 
I 
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contacts generated by appellant. In short, Medexam owned 
and had control over everything including customer lists. 
The actions of Mr. Smith, president of Medexam, in 
controlling appellant are further evidenced by the fol-
lowing as found on page nine of the Reporter's Transcript, 
(R.0044) 
"Referee: Well, now, these calls from Medexam, 
what would they pertain to, do you know? 
Blamires: I don't know. There were a number that 
were made. Mr. Smith came out there on 
one occasion and demanded that he be able 
to rearrange the office that was set up 
there •.• " 
Likewise, the Court's attention is invited to page ten 
of the Reporter's transcript (R.0045) wherein the Referee 
directed attention to Exhibit two. (R.0026) Mr. Smith 
attempts to explain away Exhibit two as follows: 
"Smith: Yes this was brought up by Craig at the 
last conversation and underlined 'All our 
personnel are required to set up spe7if~c 
goals in writing with management rev1ew1ng 
their progress.' Now, that states exactly 
what this memoranda did. My people, my 
permanent employees in Salt Lake were 
required to come up with some specific goals. 
In the next paragraph, however, it says, 
'I want from you a written list of goals' 
in order to assist you, and it was not sent 
out as a memoranda of requirement to anybody 
except my own people." 
In one breath Mr. Smith claims he did not say it was 
necessary for appellant to prepare a list, and in the next 
breath Mr. Smith says, "I want from you a written list 
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of goals." 
The purpose for Mr. Smith, president of Medexam, 
wanting a written list of goals is evident from his 0~ 
testimony. "I believe that our production will improve 
each month if goal setting is a top priority with us." 
(Page ten of the Reporter's transcript, R.0045) 
After reviewing the entire record, there can be no 
dispute as shown above that Medexam, by and through its 
president, exercised control over almost every aspect of 
Mr. Blarnires and not merely the limited control the Appeals 
Referee mentioned. 
As one of the supports for the Appeals Referee's 
decision, the Referee points to the fact that appellant 
was able to hire operators of branch offices. It should 
be remembered, however, that as the number of branch offices, 
grew and their productivity grew, Medexam was a major 
recipient inasmuch as Medexam received a portion of the 
fees generated by the branch offices. As an incentive to 
appellant, Medexam permitted appellant to hire and negotiate i 
the precentage of the fees which would be paid to the 
branch office operators. But the branch office operators 
were controlled by Medexam and were required by Medexam to 
charge the same fee for their services as were charged 
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by Medexam. Additionally, appellant testified on page 
eight of the Reporter's transcript, (R.0043) 
"On several occasions, Medexam, if I was an 
independent contractor, and if these were my 
people, why would Medexam call personally my 
people (I'm using this paraphrasing stuff) 
calling up my people giving them directives, 
'You do this, such and such.' I call them up 
and find out that they have been told something 
different, than I call them up. Why is it then 
that they will obey Medexam and they won't obey 
me? ••• " 
Also it is important to note that according to appellant's 
testimony on page fourteen of the Reporter's transcript, 
(R.0049) each of the branch operators signed an agree-
ment with Medexam. In addition, as already pointed out, 
Medexam, through its president, demanded that appellant 
obtain a list of goals from each of the satellite operators, 
and further, all of the fees generated by these satellite 
offices were not paid to Mr. Blamires but were paid 
directly to Medexam. Medexam did all of the billings 
for the branch offices as well. And Mr. Smith threatened 
to take away appellant the entire Idaho area confining 
Mr. Blamires to the city of Ogden only. 
It can be seen from the foregoing that there is 
substantial convincing evidence in support of appellant's 
contention that he was not free from control or direction 
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of his employer, Medexam. 
In further support of appellant's position, is 
Creameries of America, supra, wherein the Court upheld 
the decision of the Appeals Referee who found that directic: 
and control were exercised by the company over the claimant. 
Some of the facts which gave rise to the Court's decision 
are as follows: 
a. The claimant could not set his own prices 
but was required to sell the companies products 
at the price set by the company. 
b. The company collected money from the 
customers. 
c. The company made suggestions and offered 
advice as to how claimant should increase sales. 
Many facts similar to those found in Creameries of I 
America are found in the case presently before the Court. I 
Another decision by this Court which is helpful is .[ 
Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. Industrial Co~i~ 
There the Appeals 1
1
. 99 Utah 259, 102 P. 2d 307 (1940). 
Commission found that certain carriers for the newspaper 
were within employment and further that they were not 
excluded by the three tests contained in the Unemployment , 
Compensation Act. Although the Act was contained in the 
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1936 compilation of Utah laws, the three tests referred 
to are the same as those contained in subsection (A), (B), 
and (C) of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. Some of the facts the Court found helpful in 
determining that the employer had the requisite control 
over the applicant were as follows: 
a. The applicant was required to sell the 
newspapers at a certain fixed price. 
b. The subscribers to the paper would pay 
their bills directly to the company and not to the 
applicant. 
c. Various individuals who worked for the 
company would instruct the applicant concerning 
delivery of their papers and generally kept check 
on them to see that they did their work. 
d. The carriers received nothing from their 
routes other than what was received by the distri-
bution of the papers to the subscribers during 
the lifetime of their contract with the company. 
It is interesting to note that the Court ruled in favor 
of the applicant even though the written contract between 
the applicant and the company stated that the company had 
no right of control, supervision, or direction over the 
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applicant or the means or method by which he could 
distribute or sell the newspapers. 
When one reviews the facts as contained in the 
Reporter's transcript and applies the law to the facts, 
it is beyond question that appellant was not free from 
control or direction by Medexam so that the exclusionary 
test contained in subsection (A) of Section 35-4-22 (j) (51 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 has not been met. 
POINT IV 
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED BY FAILING TO 
FIND THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT EXCLUDED FROM EMPLOY-
MENT BY SUBSECTION (B) OF SECTION 35-4-22 (j) (5) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The second exclusionary test contained in Section 
35-4-22 (j) (5) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is as follows: 
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course 
of the business for which such service is 
performed or that such service is performed 
outside of all the places of business of 
the enterprise for which such service is 
performed; and •.. " 
It is clear from the Record that appellant performed 
physical examinations at a place which was known as 
"Medexam". The telephone number was listed under the 
name of Medexam, and all pyhsical examinations performed 
ff · Althoug!.l by appellant were performed at the Medexam o ~ce. 
the Appeals Referee made no specific findings or decision 
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regarding the exclusionary test contained in subsection 
(B), there was ample evidence from which the Appeals Referee 
could have found that the test in subsection (B) was not 
met so that appellant could not be excluded from being in 
employment as defined by the Utah Employment Security Act. 
The failure of the Appeals Referee to so find was error. 
POINT V 
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND 
THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT EXCLUDED FROM EMPLOYMENT 
BY SUBSECTION (C) OF SECTION 35-4-22 (j) (5) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Subsection (C) of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) contains 
the third exclusionary test which is as follows: 
(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in 
an independently established trade, occupation, 
profession, or business of the same nature 
as that involved in the contract of service. 
In a well reasoned opinion, Chief Justice Wolfe said 
in Leach v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 123 
Utah 423, 260 P. 2d 744, (1953), 
"In Fuller Brush Company v. Industrial Commission, 
supra, we pointed out that a shoe shiner, ~n auto 
mechanic, a plumber, and a barber meeet th~s 
requirement because the services which they 
perform emanate as a part of a business in which 
they are engaged. They perform services for 
others while in the pursuit of a business 
independently established and ~n which.they.are 
customarily engaged and for wh~ch serv~ce l~ke a 
common carrier they hold themselves out to 
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perfor.m. The plaintiffs urged that each dealer 
was customarily engaged in the independently 
established business of salesmanship. This 
contention· is untenable. Requirement (C) 
contemplates that the service rendered is a 
part of, and is rendered in pursuance of, a 
business of the person rendering the service, 
independently established, in which that person 
is customarily engaged. In other words the 
'independently established business' must exist 
independent of the services under consideration 
in the sense that it is the whole-of which the 
particular service is a part." Id. at 748. 
It is apparent from the decision rendered by the 
Appeals Referee which was affirmed by the Board of Review 
that the Appeals Referee did not address the question of 
whether appellant was engaged in an independently establish 
trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same 
nature as that involved in the contract of service. By 
failing to so rule, the Appeals Referee erred. There is 
ample evidence in the Record to support a finding that 
appellant was not engeged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, profession, or business. Appellant 
had performed the same kind of services for a company 
entitled Body Meterics previous to his employment with 
Medexam. While employed by Medexam he acted as regional 
manager and conducted physical examinations. 
11 Was terminatec As in Leach, supra, when the appe ant 
by Medexam, he became unemployed and had to secure employrre: 
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elsewhere. He had no business established independently 
of his relationship with Medexam. ·He had no business 
from which his services with Medexam emanated, but he 
was dependent on Medexam for his business. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the law as supported by the 
facts that appellant, Craig Blamires, was within employ-
ment as contemplated by the Utah Employment Security Act 
and was not excluded by any of the exclusionary tests 
of the Act. Appellant is therefore entitled to receive 
unemployment compensation, and this Court should reverse 
the decision of the respondent directing it to grant 
to appellant unemployment compensation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HESS, VAN WAGENEN, PAGE & HESS 
Gerald E. Hess 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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